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Abstract
The importance of non-cognitive skills in determining long-term human capital and labor
market outcomes is widely acknowledged, but relatively little is known about how non-cognitive
skills may shape educational investments by parents early in life. This paper evaluates the
parental response to variation in non-cognitive skills among their children in rural Gansu
province, China, employing a household fixed effects specification. The results suggest that
on average, parents invest no more in terms of educational expenditure in children who have
better non-cognitive skills relative to their siblings. However, there is significant heterogeneity
with respect to maternal education; less educated mothers appear to reinforce differences in
non-cognitive skills between their children, while more educated mothers compensate for these
differences. The evidence is consistent with this pattern corresponding to greater bargaining
power for more educated mothers and different preferences for compensation among more ed-
ucated women. In addition, there is evidence that these compensatory investments lead to
catch-up in non-cognitive skills over time for children of more educated mothers.
1 Introduction
In recent years, both research and policy debates have placed increasing emphasis on the importance
of non-cognitive skills in determining long-term economic outcomes. Data primarily from indus-
trialized countries has suggested that non-cognitive skills have a large impact on adult economic
welfare, measured as earnings and labor productivity (Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Heckman,
∗Thanks to Flavio Cunha, Benjamin Feigenberg, Paul Frijters, Paul Glewwe, Lucie Schmidt, Kevin Schnepel and
Chih-Ming Tan for detailed comments, and to seminar participants at Williams, the Chinese Economists’ Society
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Stixrud and Urzua, 2006; Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov, 2006; Carneiro, Crawford and
Goodman, 2007). There are many possible causal pathways through which stronger non-cognitive
skills may lead to improved educational and economic outcomes: individuals with enhanced skills
are more likely to be persistent in achieving strong academic outcomes or building professional
expertise, may be more resilient in the face of setbacks, or may be better able to forge useful
professional relationships. One particularly important channel, however, is the relationship forged
much earlier in life between children and their parents.
Variation in non-cognitive skills among children may affect parental investments in several ways.
First, variation in non-cognitive skills could alter the weight that a parent places on that child’s
welfare or future income in his/her utility function. Parents could favor a child with stronger non-
cognitive skills with whom they forge a stronger relationship, or a child with weaker non-cognitive
skills if s/he seems to require more nurturing. Second, even if the weight parents place on their
children’s welfare is unchanged, non-cognitive skills will affect children’s future income, and may
affect the returns to human capital investment in a given child.
Depending on whether parents emphasize efficiency or equality, they may then invest more
or less in human capital development for children of varying levels of non-cognitive skills. Given
that a number of evaluations have found that targeted early intervention can affect children’s non-
cognitive skills,1 understanding whether these interventions crowd parental investment in or out
may be a useful contribution to the ongoing policy debate about how best to develop non-cognitive
skills.
The objective of this paper is to analyze whether non-cognitive skills measured in childhood
and adolescence have a significant impact on the within-household allocation of educational expen-
diture among households in rural Gansu province, China. We employ a panel dataset that provides
a particularly detailed set of outcome measures for a large cohort of children in one of the poorest
provinces in China. Focusing on a sample of two-children families, our primary specification ex-
amines how parents respond to differences in non-cognitive skills between siblings conditional on
household fixed effects, and whether this response varies based on the characteristics of the parents.
Our results suggest that while parents are not responsive to differences in non-cognitive skills
on average—neither reinforcing nor compensating for these differences—there is significant hetero-
geneity with respect to characteristics of the parents, and particularly the mother. Households with
more educated mothers show evidence of significantly more compensatory investment compared to
households with less educated mothers. For a child who exhibits non-cognitive skills that are one
standard deviation lower than his/her sibling, an increase in maternal education from the 25th to
the 75th percentile, or from one to five years of maternal education, would result in an increase in
discretionary educational expenditure (comprising all educational expenditure excluding tuition)
directed to this child of nearly 30%. There is also an increase in tuition directed to this child of
1The results from the Perry preschool study as reported in Schweinhart et al. (2005) are among the best known
in this respect.
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around 5%, though this effect is noisily estimated.
These results are estimated conditional on household fixed effects, and thus control for common
observed and unobserved characteristics within the household. There is very little evidence of
comparable heterogeneity with respect to the education of the father.
This observed pattern of heterogeneous response—more compensation in households with a
more educated mother—could be consistent with a number of possible channels. More educated
mothers may simply be better able to recognize the non-cognitive deficits in their children and
to compensate appropriately. Maternal education may simply be a proxy for income or other
household characteristics, and higher-income households may have a preference for intrahousehold
compensation. Alternatively, women may have a preference for compensatory investments while
men do not, and more educated women may have greater bargaining power and the ability to
impose this preference within the household. It is also possible that more educated women have a
stronger preference for compensatory investment compared to less educated women.
Further exploration suggests that the first two channels are not particularly salient in this
context: there is little evidence consistent with parental learning or higher income leading to a
compensatory response by more educated mothers. However, it does seem that greater bargaining
power by more educated mothers is a relevant channel. We also cannot rule out that more educated
mothers have different preferences compared to less educated mothers.
In the final section of the paper, we analyze whether this variation in compensatory vis-a-vis
reinforcing behavior results in catch-up in non-cognitive skills over time for children in households
with more educated mothers—where struggling children receive greater investment—compared to
children in households with less educated mothers. Analyzing longitudinal data observed for the
first-born child over time, we find evidence of significantly greater catch-up in non-cognitive skills
between ages 9-12 and ages 17-20 for children of more educated mothers. In other words, the
correlation between maternal education and children’s non-cognitive skills is increasing over time.
If the economic returns to non-cognitive skills are significant, this is a channel through which
inequality across households can widen over time.
Our paper contributes to several related literatures on intrahousehold allocation and human
capital investment. First, there is an extensive literature that examines parental responses to
differences in children’s endowment; Almond and Mazumder (2013) provide a recent review. The
evidence here has been mixed. Bharadwaj et al. (2013b), Royer (2009), and Currie and Almond
(2011) find little or no evidence of either compensatory or reinforcing behavior. Akresh et al.
(2012), Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009), Bharadwaj et al. (2013a), Almond et al. (n.d.), Adhvaryu
and Nyshadham (2014) and Aizer and Cunha (2012) find parents exhibit reinforcing behavior in
Burkina Faso, China, Chile, Sweden, Tanzania, and the United States, while Del Bono et al. (2012)
find evidence of compensatory behavior in breast-feeding decisions and birth weight. Frijters et
al. (2013) find evidence of reinforcing behavior with respect to variation in cognitive ability in the
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U.S., employing left- or right-handedness as an instrument for cognitive development. Leight (2014)
finds evidence of compensating behavior with respect to height-for-age using the same sample as
this paper. This literature, however, focuses primarily on parental responses to children’s health
endowment and cognitive ability. Our paper is one of the first papers that examines whether parents
respond to children’s non-cognitive skills.2
Second, a more nascent literature has sought to analyze the role of parental investments in
developing non-cognitive as well as cognitive skills; the most notable paper in this literature is
Cunha et al. (2010). Here the primary emphasis has been on the timing of investments, and
the complementarity between early and late investments. Given that these papers have focused
primarily on industrialized countries where most families have fewer children and parents may be
less resource-constrained, the question of within-household competition for parental investment has
received less attention.
Finally, our paper contributes to a much larger and older literature nested within the literature
on non-unitary models of the household that argues that greater decision-making power for mothers
leads to greater investment in children on average (Lundberg et al., 1997). A number of papers
have found empirical evidence that greater bargaining power of women in developing countries in
particular leads to more investment in health and education for children (Bobonis, 2009; Duflo, 2003;
Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2002; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003). However, there is very little
evidence of a relationship between maternal bargaining power and a preference for compensatory
human capital investment within the household, rather than the overall level of human capital
investment. One recent paper focused on the U.S. also finds evidence of educated women investing
more time in children with lower birth weight, while less educated women show the opposite pattern
(Hsin, 2012). Our paper joins this nascent literature and provides evidence for the first time of
variation in compensatory behavior with respect to the education of both parents in a developing
country.3
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
describes the empirical strategy and the primary results, and Section 4 presents robustness checks
and evidence about the relevant channels. Section 5 examines the longitudinal evidence about
persistence of non-cognitive skills over time, and Section 6 concludes.
2The only other relevant paper is Gelber and Isen (2013). While it is not the focus of their work, they report in
their appendix that parents respond positively to a child with greater observed non-cognitive abilities.
3There is also a related literature that has analyzed whether mothers have a preference for greater gender equity
in the allocation of expenditure between children, where the evidence has been mixed. Quisumbing and Maluccio
(2003) find in different contexts maternal bargaining power has different impacts on relative investments in boys and
girls.
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2 Data
The data set used in this paper is the Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF), a panel
study of rural children conducted in Gansu province, China. Gansu, located in northwest China,
is one of the poorest and most rural provinces in China. The description of the data here draws
substantially on the description in Leight (2014).
The first wave of the GSCF was conducted in 2000, and surveyed a representative sample of
2,000 children aged 9–12 in 20 rural counties, supplementing these surveys with additional surveys
of their mothers, household heads, teachers, principals, and village leaders. These children are
denoted the “index children.” All but one of these 2,000 children have complete information in the
first wave.
The second wave, implemented in 2004, re-surveyed the first sample of children at age 13–16
and also added a survey of their fathers. 1,872 children, or 93.6% of the original sample, were
re-interviewed in the second wave. In addition, surveys were added of the eldest younger sibling of
the index child. These additional children are denoted “younger siblings.” Surveys are conducted
directly with the younger siblings, as well as with their homeroom teachers; in addition, mothers
and fathers report limited supplementary information about the younger siblings.
In early 2009, a third wave of surveying was conducted, re-interviewing the index children
during Spring Festival, a period at which many of them had returned to their natal villages. In
cases where the sampled individual was not available, parents were asked to provide information
about their child’s education and employment status. 1,437 individuals, or 72% of the original
sample, were interviewed directly in this wave, and information was collected in parental interviews
for an additional 426 sample children.
The household surveys in waves one (2000) and two (2004) included extensive questions about
schooling outcomes, household expenditure on education, child time use, time investments in edu-
cation by parents and teachers, and child and parental attitudes, as well as more standard socioe-
conomic variables. The index children also completed a number of achievement and cognitive tests.
Younger siblings also completed these tests in wave two.
In addition, each wave of data collection included survey questions posed to the sample chil-
dren that were designed to measure their non-cognitive skills. In the first and second waves, the
survey measured both internalizing and externalizing behavioral challenges: the former refers to
intra-personal problems (e.g., withdrawal and anxiety), and the latter to inter-personal problems
(destructive behavior, aggression, and hyper-activity). Both measures of non-cognitive skills are
constructed by recording the respondent’s agreement or disagreement with a series of statements
and then applying item response theory (IRT) to generate internalizing and externalizing scores.
The measures are identical across waves one and two, and the scores are standardized to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In the third wave, a Rosenberg self-esteem index
and a depressive index were measured. Further detail about the construction of the non-cognitive
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skills measures can be found in Glewwe, Huang and Park (2013).
Non-cognitive skills of the younger siblings were measured only in wave two. For ease of interpre-
tation, the primary non-cognitive skills measures employed here (the externalizing and internalizing
indices) have been inverted; in the original index, a higher value indicates more challenges, but in
our index a higher value indicates better non-cognitive skills.
In this paper, we will focus on a subsample of the families in the survey: those with two children
in the household where both children have reported measurements for non-cognitive and cognitive
skills in the second-wave survey. If the index children and the younger sibling are the only children
in the household, then the surveys provide a complete overview of parental allocations and child
endowment. Complete data is available for 388 families drawn from 90 localities in 20 counties,
and these households constitute the relevant subsample. In our sample, only 6.5% of households
have one child. The remaining households are excluded because the index child has two or more
siblings, or has one older sibling for whom non-cognitive ability is not reported. In the robustness
checks, we will also present results employing a slightly larger sample including households where
these two children (the index child and the younger sibling) are part of a larger family.4
Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the sample, including the years in which data is collected,
the children that are observed in each wave, and their age at the point of data collection. Note
that household-level data is collected in waves one and two.
Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics for the subsample of two-children families and
the overall sample for key demographic indicators of interest, as well as a t-test for equality between
the two means; the covariates reported are measured in the second wave of the survey, the wave
in primary use here. It is evident that there are no significant differences in income or parental
education between the sample and the subsample. However, households in the subsample are
slightly younger and have younger children. This primarily reflects the exclusion of larger families
or families in which the index child is the younger child; these families are generally headed by older
parents. Importantly, there are also no significant differences between the reported non-cognitive
skills and cognitive skills in the second wave for the index children in the full sample and the
subsample.
The dependent variable of interest is educational expenditure per child per semester, reported
by the head of household in six categories: tuition, educational supplies, food consumed in school,
transportation and housing, tutoring, and other fees.5 Each household separately reports expen-
diture for each child in each of these categories. Discretionary expenditure is defined as the sum
of all expenditures excluding tuition. Summary statistics for average expenditure per child for the
4While China’s One-Child Policy was in effect during the period in which these children were born, many rural
households could nonetheless have two children legally under various exemptions to the policy (Gu et al., 2007). It is
not possible using this dataset to accurately identify for each household whether it was in technical compliance with
the policy.
5In China, textbook fees are mandatory and levied as part of the overall tuition, and here they are likewise reported
in the tuition category. Educational supplies is supplies other than textbooks.
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subsample of families analyzed can be found in Panel B of Table 1. Total educational expenditure
averages around 360 yuan per child per semester, or a total of 1,440 yuan for two children over a
year. An average of 20% of household income is allocated to educational expenditure.
We focus on educational expenditure given that it is the primary form of child-specific expendi-
ture reported in this dataset. The only other type of child-specific expenditure reported is medical
expenditure over the past year; only 25% of households report any positive medical expenditure
for either child over the past year, and unsurprisingly this expenditure is highly correlated with
reported illness (i.e., it is reasonable to assume that very little of this expenditure corresponds
to preventive care). Given that we are primarily interested in human capital investment with
long-term returns, we do not focus on medical expenditure.
3 Empirical strategy and results
3.1 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy entails evaluating whether parental expenditure on education for children
is correlated with measures of non-cognitive skills, conditional on household fixed effects. In other
words, our primary specification identifies whether parents are more likely to invest in a child who
has stronger non-cognitive skills relative to a sibling. The child’s observed non-cognitive skills
will be denoted Ncogihct, for child i in household h, living in county c and born in year t: the
non-cognitive variables employed will include the externalizing and internalizing index, as well as
a summary measure of non-cognitive skills that is the mean of the two indices.
All non-cognitive indices have been standardized to have means equal to zero and standard
deviations equal to one. The original indices in this case are constructed such that a higher value is
indicative of more severe challenges in the specified domain, and thus weaker non-cognitive skills.
In order to facilitate interpretation, the indices here have been inverted such that a higher value is
indicative of stronger non-cognitive skills.
The dependent variable, educational expenditure, is denoted Yihct. The specification includes
household fixed effects ηh, year-of-birth fixed effects νt, and a vector of child-level covariates Xihct,
yielding the following equation. Child-level covariates include gender, the sibling’s gender, birth
parity (i.e., whether a child is first-born or second-born), height-for-age, reported grades in school,
and scores on grade-specific achievement tests administered in math and Chinese. This specification
is estimated with and without interactions with parental education Shct.
6 Standard errors will be
clustered at the county level in all specifications.7
Yihct = β1Ncogihct + β2Ncogihct × Shct +Xihct + νt + ηh + εihct (1)
6The direct effect of varying parental education on non-cognitive skills is absorbed by the household fixed effects.
7We regard clustering at the county level as a conservative strategy for inference. Our subsample includes 20
counties and 90 villages; our results are also consistent if we cluster at the village level.
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The identification assumption for this family of specifications requires that non-cognitive skills
are uncorrelated with other unobservable variables that determine parental allocations. This as-
sumption would be violated, for example, if parents invest more in a favored child, who is then
observed to have stronger non-cognitive skills.
In order to present some preliminary evidence about the relationship between non-cognitive
skills and child characteristics conditional on household fixed effects, the following specifications
can be estimated, regressing the internalizing and externalizing indices on child covariates Xihct,
conditional on household fixed effects.
Ncogihct = β1Xihct + ηh + εihct (2)
The results can be found in Table 2: Panel A reports the correlations with sibling parity, age,
gender, and grade level, and Panel B reports the correlations with various measures of the child’s
endowment. Interestingly, in Panel A there is no evidence of any significant correlation between the
internalizing index and any child characteristic. However, for the externalizing index we observe
that non-cognitive skills are weaker for second-born children, children who are younger on average,
boys and children enrolled in lower grades in school. There is, of course, a high degree of correlation
among these covariates: second-born children are on average younger, enrolled in lower grades, and
more likely to be boys.8 Columns (9) and (10) show the results of a multiple regression including all
four covariates; there is some evidence here that the most robust correlations are between gender
and grade level and the externalizing index.
Panel B shows that there is little evidence of significant correlations between non-cognitive skills
and other measures of endowment: specifically, height-for-age, and various measures of cognitive
skills. This includes the child’s grades reported in the last academic year in math and Chinese,
and their score on a grade-specific achievement test. The only exception is a significant correlation
between the internalizing index and the achievement test score.
In light of these results, the primary specifications all include year-of-birth fixed effects as well as
controls for gender, sibling’s gender, sibling parity, height-for-age, and all three reported measures
of cognitive skills as measured in the second wave, contemporaneously with non-cognitive skills.
The inclusion of grade fixed effects is more complex; given that the primary dependent variable of
interest is educational expenditure, grade level can plausibly be considered an outcome. However,
the primary results will also be robust to the inclusion of grade fixed effects.
Given that the primary specifications are estimated conditional on household and year-of-birth
fixed effects, it is also useful to examine how much variation in the child characteristics of interest
is observed within a given household and within a given birth year. Table A1 in the Appendix
8The implications of gender selection for this analysis will be explored in greater detail in Section 4.2. Around
40% of children in the primary sample are girls; however, 49% of first-born children are girls, a ratio not significantly
different from 0.5, while only 31% of second-born children are girls. This is consistent with other anthropological
evidence indicating that sex selection in China occurs primarily after the first birth.
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reports the R-squared in a simple regression including only the specified fixed effects as explanatory
variables and the specified measure of non-cognitive or cognitive skills as the dependent variable.
In general, between 50% and 60% of the variation in non-cognitive skills is explained by household
fixed effects, suggesting there is still considerable within-household variation.
3.2 Primary results
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (1) without the interaction terms with parental
education. The objective is to test whether parental allocations of educational expenditure are
responsive, on average, to variation in non-cognitive skills between siblings; the measures of expen-
diture include total expenditure, discretionary expenditure (the sum of all expenditure excluding
tuition), and six individual categories. Enrollment is universal among the subsample of interest, and
thus school enrollment is not reported as an outcome. The results show coefficients that are small
in magnitude, varying in sign, and generally insignificant, with the exception of one marginally
significant coefficient in Panel B. In particular, there is no evidence of a significant effect for total
or discretionary expenditure. This suggests that parents are neither systematically compensat-
ing children with weaker non-cognitive skills, nor systematically reinforcing these differences by
directing more expenditure to the child with greater skills.9
In light of this pattern, we then examine whether parents who themselves have certain character-
istics are more likely to respond to measured differences in the non-cognitive skills of their children.
The most obvious relevant characteristic is education. There is limited variation in occupational
structure among these households, who are all living in rural counties and primarily dependent on
agriculture; there is also limited variation in ethnicity, religion, or cultural background. While the
average level of education reported is relatively low—four years for mothers and seven years for
fathers—there is considerable variation. Around 75% of mothers report completing at least one
year of formal schooling, and 10% report completing junior high school. For fathers, around 90%
report completing at least one year of formal schooling, and 10% report completing senior high
school.
Figure 2 shows histograms of the distribution of both maternal and paternal education. The
correlation between maternal and paternal education is positive, but low in magnitude (around
.3). Unsurprisingly, education of both parents is also positively correlated with income and other
measures of household wealth.
In addition, Figures 3a and 3b show the distribution of intrahousehold (between-sibling) dif-
ferences in non-cognitive skills and in normalized expenditure residuals for households at different
levels of maternal education. We can observe that the mean absolute difference in non-cognitive
skills between siblings is around .75 standard deviations, and this is roughly constant across house-
9In regressions not shown, we explore the hypothesis that parents respond to differences in non-cognitive skills
differently for children of varying age or gender, and find that interaction terms between non-cognitive skills and age
and gender are uniformly insignificant. Tabulations available upon request.
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holds of different levels of maternal education. Normalized expenditure residuals are calculated by
regressing expenditure on child characteristics (gender, birth parity, cognitive skills, and height-for-
age), generating the residuals and standardizing them to have mean zero and standard deviation
one. The mean absolute difference is around .4 standard deviations, and this seems to be larger at
higher levels of maternal education.
To identify whether parents who are more educated respond differentially to differences in non-
cognitive skills, we then re-estimate equation (1) including interaction terms between non-cognitive
skills and parental education. Again, the specification includes controls for a wide range of child
characteristics including gender, sibling parity, and cognitive skills, and household and year-of-birth
fixed effects. The results analyzing variation in parental response to children’s non-cognitive skills
with respect to parental education are reported in Table 4.
We observe a robust pattern in which households in which mothers have low levels of education
(roughly speaking, fewer than three years of schooling) provide more expenditure to children with
better non-cognitive skills, reinforcing the pre-existing differences, while households with more
educated mothers seem to engage in compensatory behavior, providing more expenditure to children
with worse skills. This is evident in the negative coefficients on the interaction term between non-
cognitive indices and maternal education. This pattern is observed for both total educational
expenditure and discretionary expenditure.10
The interaction terms for paternal education, on the other hand, are smaller in magnitude,
heterogeneous in sign, and generally not statistically significant. Panels B and D report the p-
values testing equality of coefficients on the interaction terms for maternal and paternal education
for the internalizing and externalizing indices, respectively.11 These coefficients are denoted βm2
and βf2 , where β
m
2 refers to the coefficient on the interaction term for maternal education, and β
f
2
refers to the analogous coefficient for paternal education. While the imprecision in the coefficients
on the paternal education interaction term does not allow us to reject equality in all cases, we can
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the maternal and the parental education interaction
terms is equal in both specifications employing total and discretionary expenditure as the dependent
variable, as well as in several additional specifications.
The magnitudes of the implied effects are also substantial. For example, consider a child who
exhibits non-cognitive skills (as measured by the internalizing index) that are one standard devi-
ation lower than his/her sibling. The coefficient on the interaction term suggests that an increase
in maternal education from the 25th to the 75th percentile, or from one to five years of maternal
education, would result in an increase in discretionary educational expenditure for this child com-
pared to his/her sibling of 29%. The magnitudes are very similar for the coefficients estimated for
10Aizer and Cunha (2012) find that the degree of parental reinforcing behaviors increases with family size. Our
finding cannot be explained by variation in family size since we restrict the sample to only those households with two
children.
11This test is implemented by estimating the two specifications simultaneously in a seemingly unrelated regression
framework, and then testing equality of the the coefficients on the two interaction terms.
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the internalizing index in Panel C. The results are robust to the inclusion of grade fixed effects,
and are also robust to re-formulating the non-cognitive variables as percentile rank variables. They
are also consistent if estimated unconditional on cognitive skills and other endowment measures.12
We also re-estimate these results using two alternate samples. First, we employ the full sample of
all households where the number of children is greater than or equal to two, rather than restricting
to households in which the index child and his or her younger sibling are the only children in
the family. (Less than 10% of the sample of interest are households with only one child.) This
yields a sample of 566 households or 1,132 children, and the estimation results can be found in
Table A2. The interaction terms on maternal education are again negative and and of roughly
equal magnitude, suggesting that the observed pattern of compensation in households with more
educated mothers is not limited to households of a particular size. (Households in which the index
child has an older sibling and no younger siblings are still not observed in this sample due to the
absence of data on the older sibling. However, the evidence presented in Table 1 suggests that
there is no significant difference in household characteristics or the non-cognitive or cognitive skills
of the index child when comparing index children observed in the subsample to the full sample.)
We also explore whether there is evidence of a correlation between birth spacing (between the
first- and second-born child) and maternal education that could be an alternate channel for the
detected pattern. There is no evidence of any correlation between birth spacing and maternal or
paternal education, and no evidence that parents respond differentially to non-cognitive skills in
households with different spacing between the two siblings.13
Second, it should be noted that gender cannot be considered to be exogenous in this sample; in
fact, nearly 70% of second-born children are boys. However, consistent with existing anthropological
evidence, there is little evidence of sex selection prior to the first birth (Gu et al., 2007). The gender
ratio for first-born children is not significantly different from .5, and the gender ratio for second-born
children who follow the birth of a son is also not significantly different from .5. Thus, sex selection is
a phenomenon primarily observed after the birth of a first-born girl. Accordingly, if we restrict the
sample to households reporting a first-born son, the distribution of gender among children in these
households can plausibly be considered quasi-exogenous. Re-estimating the primary specification
for this smaller sample generates the same observed pattern of results.14
To sum up, there seems to be robust evidence that parents do respond to non-cognitive skills
in allocating investment, but this response is very different in households with differing levels of
maternal education.15
12Tabulations are not reported for concision, but are available upon request.
13To be more specific, if we re-estimate equation (1) adding an interaction between birth spacing and non-cognitive
skills, this interaction is consistently insignificant. The interaction between maternal education and education remains
significant and of comparable magnitude.
14Tabulations are not reported for concision, but are available upon request.
15If we replace the non-cognitive skills interaction terms with interaction terms including cognitive skills and height-
for-age in equation (1), the estimated coefficients β1 and β2 have the same sign as the results employing non-cognitive
skills. However, one should be cautious in interpreting the results since using the same dataset, Leight (2014) presents
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4 Robustness checks and channels
4.1 Robustness checks
Parental favoritism Parental favoritism may interact with non-cognitive skills in two ways.
First, if a child with better non-cognitive skills is more likely to be the parental favorite and thus
receives more parental investment, favoritism could be interpreted as a channel through which
non-cognitive skills affect educational investment. Second, if parents choose a favorite child early
in life, invest more in this favored child, and s/he is then observed to have better non-cognitive
skills, this could be a source of bias in our primary specification. The direction of the bias in this
case will be towards the detection of reinforcing behavior: i.e., this will generate upward bias on
the estimated coefficient β1. There will be downward bias in the estimation of β2, the interaction
term with parental education, if households with more educated mothers systematically exhibit less
favoritism vis-a-vis households with less educated mothers.
We implement two tests to evaluate whether favoritism is relevant in this analysis. First,
we exploit questions in the survey of mothers in which she reports the identity of the children
who will provide more emotional and economic support in the future. We designate a child as a
favorite if s/he is identified as the primary source of both emotional and economic support, and
examine whether more educated mothers are more likely to provide more expenditure to their
favorite children, conditional on non-cognitive skills and the full set of child characteristic controls
already reported. Importantly, there is no significant correlation between non-cognitive skills and
the identity of the favorite child, nor is there any heterogeneity in this correlation with respect
to maternal education, suggesting that it is not the case that children with stronger non-cognitive
skills are more likely to build relationships with parents and be identified as the favorite.
The specification of interest is as follows, where Fihct denotes a dummy for favorite, equal to
one if a given child is the reported favorite and zero otherwise.
Yihct = β1Ncogihct + β2Ncogihct × Shct + β3Fihct + β4Fhct × Shct + β5Xihct + νt + ηh + εihct (3)
The results are reported in Panel A of Table A3.16 In general, there is no systematic pref-
erence in expenditure for the favored child; there is some evidence of greater preference for the
favored child among more educated mothers, but the difference is not significant.17 These results
suggest that favoritism is unlikely to be a particularly important channel for the observed pattern
of compensation. In assessing bias in the main specification, the fact that more educated mothers
may exhibit slightly greater favoritism among their children would generate bias in the opposite
evidence that height-for-age is highly correlated with past parental investments.
16For concision, only the core sample of two-child households is employed in this analysis.
17It is also useful to note that the favorite child is significantly more likely to be a boy, though there is no significant
variation in this relationship with respect to maternal education. Adding an interaction term between gender and
maternal education to the primary specification also does not affect the results.
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direction of the observed effect.
Serial correlation in investment However, given that our measure of parental favoritism is no
doubt not fully informative, we also perform an additional test to evaluate the potential for bias in
the primary specifications due to serial correlation in parental investment. We presume that there
is limited scope for parental investment (via educational expenditure or other, correlated measures
of investment) to affect non-cognitive skills prior to primary school. Accordingly, we construct a
new variable Ncogprimihct that is defined as non-cognitive skills at primary school age, as observed in
wave one for the older sibling or wave two for the younger sibling. We similarly define expenditure
measures at primary school age Y primihct . We then estimate a specification prior to the specification
of interest, though rather than using year-of-birth fixed effects, we employ fixed effects for the age
of the child in the survey year, νage.
Y primihct = β1Ncog
prim
ihct + β2Ncog
prim
ihct × Shct + β3Xihct + νage + ηh + εihct (4)
The results from estimating equation (4) are reported in Table A4.18 We observe a similar
pattern to the primary results: evidence of greater compensation in households with more educated
mothers, and no systematic variation with respect to paternal education. While the coefficients
are smaller in magnitude, the mean levels of expenditure are also lower when we examine only
children at primary school age. The estimated coefficients suggest that a one standard deviation
increase in maternal education leads to an increase in discretionary expenditure directed to a child
with one standard deviation lower non-cognitive skills of around 22%, compared to an effect size of
29% using the original specification. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the observed
pattern does not solely reflect bias introduced by differential prior investment.
Alternate measures of non-cognitive skills Our primary measure of non-cognitive skills is
based on children’s self-reported status. This may raise questions about noise in the data, especially
given that some children in the sample are relatively young. In particular, it is possible that children
from some households are better able to understand and respond to the questions designed to elicit
measures of their non-cognitive skills; this could result, for example, in a pattern in which there is
greater measurement error in non-cognitive skills in households with less educated mothers. While
in general this would result in attenuation of the coefficients on non-cognitive skills for children
from households with less educated mothers, it is useful to verify that the observed results are
robust to alternate measures.
The other measure of non-cognitive skills available in this data is drawn from surveys of the
children’s teachers, who are asked to report whether a child possesses a series of eight characteristics,
18The sample is slightly smaller than in the primary results (10 observations missing) due to the absence of detailed
expenditure data in wave one for five households.
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both positive and negative.19 Given the limited variation in this teacher-reported measure, which
has only eight unique values, we construct a dummy variable equal to one if the teacher’s reports
of the child’s characteristics places him or her in the top half of all children, denoted TcogDihct.
We then estimate a specification parallel to our primary specification of interest, employing this
dummy variable as a measure of non-cognitive skills.
Yihct = β1Tcog
D
ihct + β2Tcog
D
ihct × Shct + β3Xihct + νt + ηh + εihct (5)
The results are reported in Table A5 and show the same pattern of greater compensation in
households with more educated mothers. The magnitude observed is similar to the magnitude in
a parallel specification using a dummy variable constructed from the original self-reported non-
cognitive skills measure.20
This evidence suggests that the observed pattern of differential compensation for adverse non-
cognitive skills in households with more educated mothers is not an artifact of the non-cognitive
self-reports. However, we preferentially use the measures of non-cognitive skills derived from self-
reports given that these measures have greater variation, and only self-reported measures can be
employed in the longitudinal analysis discussed in Section 5 examining persistence of non-cognitive
skills into young adulthood. Teacher reports are, clearly, no longer available for the index children
once they have completed secondary school.21
4.2 Channels
There are at least four channels that would be consistent with the observed pattern of compensation
only in high maternal education households. First, more educated mothers may simply be better
able to learn about variation in non-cognitive skills among their children, while less educated
mothers do not acquire this information. (By contrast, more educated fathers are no better able
to recognize differences in non-cognitive skills compared to less educated fathers.)
Second, maternal education may simply be a proxy for income or other household characteristics,
and higher-income households may have a preference for compensatory investment.
Third, households where mothers are more educated may be households where mothers have
greater bargaining power and a greater ability to impose their preferences around intrahousehold
allocation, assuming on average mothers do in fact have a preference for compensatory investment.22
19This series includes whether the child is smart, conscientious, reasonable/well-mannered, clean, enjoys work, is
lively/imaginative, gets along with others, likes to cry, or lacks confidence.
20If the same specification is re-estimated using the continuous teacher-reported measure, the reports are close to
significant at conventional levels using the full sample, and significant if left-tail outliers are trimmed.
21The survey also reports maternal assessments of the child’s non-cognitive skills but only for the index child,
rendering an evaluation of the impact of non-cognitive skills on allocations within a household impossible. This data
will be exploited in another robustness check reported in Section 4.2.
22This assumption is consistent with the finding that women are more inequality-averse in experimental literature
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In households where mothers are less educated, the paternal preference may dominate, and this
may entail a weaker preference for intrahousehold compensation. Fourth, it is also possible that
more educated women have a greater preference for compensatory investment compared to less
educated women. We will seek to present evidence about each potential channel in turn.
Parental learning about child characteristics The first postulated channel is that more
educated mothers are better able to recognize deficits in non-cognitive skills among their children
and respond appropriately, while less educated mothers do not recognize deficits in non-cognitive
skills. It is also possible that more educated mothers acquire information about the returns to
investing in children with weak non-cognitive skills that less educated mothers do not acquire. In
either case, it is also necessary to assume there is no correlation between paternal education and
the relevant information acquisition process.
If this channel is important, then ceteris paribus we would expect more compensation among
parents who spend more time with their children, and thus have the opportunity to learn more
about their child’s characteristics and/or how these characteristics affect the returns to investment
on that child. In this survey, parents report the time spent in a typical week either playing with
or talking to children; about 65% of both mothers and fathers report that in a typical week they
spend any time on either of these activities. (They do not report the division of this time between
children.) There is a positive, albeit relatively weak, correlation between parental education and
time spent with children.
In order to test whether the observed pattern in fact reflects a process in which educated
mothers spend more time with their children and thus learn more about their characteristics, we
estimate the following specification including the original interaction term between non-cognitive
skills and parental education, and adding an interaction term between non-cognitive skills and
average hours spent per week with children Timehct for both the mother and the father. (In order
to enable comparison of the coefficients on the two variables, in each specification the time variable
is re-scaled to have the same mean as the parental education variable.) The same control variables
included in the primary specification are included, and standard errors are clustered at the county
level.
Yihct = β1Ncogihct + β2Noncogihct × Shct + β3Noncogihct × Timehct + β4Xihct (6)
+ νt + ηh + εihct
The results can be found in Panels A and B of Table 5; Panel A reports the results employing
maternal education and maternal time, while Panel B reports corresponding results for the father.
(Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, 2002; Selten and Ockenfels, 1998; Dufwenberg and
Muren, 2006). For example, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that women are more concerned about equalizing
earnings during experiments, while men are more focused on maximizing efficiency.
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We can observe that the coefficients β2 remain highly significant and negative for the mother.
While the estimated coefficients β3 are negative, indicating there is some evidence that mothers
who spend more time with their children do compensate more, they are small in magnitude and
generally insignificant. For fathers, the evidence suggests that if anything, fathers who spend more
time with their children compensate less.23
However, it is also important to note that if the most important information educated mothers
acquire is information about variation in the returns to investment with respect to child character-
istics, rather than variation in child characteristics, this learning process may be largely unrelated
to time spent with the child. In that case, the test implemented here would have limited power.
In addition, in the survey of mothers, there is a set of questions related to a child’s non-cognitive
skills in which each mother reports whether she agrees or disagrees with a set of statements related to
her child’s shyness, emotional stability, interaction with friends, temper, self-esteem, stubbornness,
etc. We can employ this data to create an index of the mother’s perceptions of a child’s non-
cognitive skills. This data is only available for the index (elder) child, so we cannot use it in
our main analysis to compare across siblings. However, we can evaluate whether more educated
mothers can better predict their children’s self-reported non-cognitive score; in fact, there is no
evidence of any relationship between maternal education and the accuracy of their assessment.24
Maternal education as a proxy for income The second postulated channel that could be
consistent with the observed pattern of differential compensation in high maternal education house-
holds is that maternal education is a proxy for household income, and higher-income parents prefer
compensatory investment. This is a priori somewhat less plausible given that there are no parallel
effects for paternal education, and in the sample of interest there is no evidence that maternal
education is more closely correlated with household income when compared to paternal education.
In fact, there is no significant difference between the magnitude of the cross-household correlation
between maternal education and income, and the magnitude of the correlation between paternal
education and income.
However, a simple test of this hypothesis can be estimated by adding an interaction term between
household income and non-cognitive skills to the primary specifications. This yields the following
estimating equations, where Ihct denotes household income; income and maternal education are
re-scaled to have the same mean in order to allow for comparison of the coefficient magnitudes.
Yihct = β1Ncogihct + β2Ncogihct × Shct + β3Inihct × Ihct + β4Xihct + νt + ηh + εihct (7)
23If this specification is re-estimated including the triple interaction between parental education and time invested,
the triple interaction terms are generally negative, though rarely significant. This also suggests that educated parents
who spend more time with their children are not compensating weaker children more, compared to educated parents
who spend less time with their children. If anything, they engage in less compensatory behavior. Tabulations are
not reported, but are available on request.
24Tabulations are not reported for concision, but are available upon request.
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The results of estimating equation (7) employing the education of the mother as the measure
of parental education can be found in Table 6. It is evident that the coefficients β3 on the income
interaction terms are small in magnitude, inconsistent in sign, and generally insignificant.25 The
coefficients on the maternal education interaction terms, by contrast, remain consistently negative
and significant. We also re-estimate this specification employing indices of productive assets and
durable household goods owned by the household, rather than income. We observe some evidence of
greater compensation among higher-asset households, though not among households reporting more
ownership of durable goods; importantly, however, the coefficient β2 remains negative, significant,
and of consistent magnitude. This suggests it is unlikely the primary results reflect shifts in parental
preferences in higher-income households.
Bargaining power and maternal education Finally, we seek to evaluate whether there is
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that maternal education is a proxy for the mother’s bar-
gaining power. In our data, mothers are asked to report who within the household makes certain
types of decisions, and we employ this data to construct two measures of household decision-making
power. The first is a general decision-making index ranging from zero to seven. The maximum
score, seven, indicates that the mother reports that she makes every one of the seven types of
decisions referenced in the survey, whereas the minimum score, zero, indicates that the mother
does not make any of the decisions.26 Given that our main outcome is educational expenditure on
children, we also construct a second measure capturing whether the mother makes decisions related
to parenting and children’s education. This measure ranges from zero to two, where zero indicates
that the mother reports no control over parenting and educational decisions, and two indicates she
reports sole control.
We then regress these decision-making measures on both the mother’s education and the differ-
ence in education in two simple specifications, including household control variables (net income,
per-capita income, and age of both parents) and county fixed effects. The decision-making variables
are denoted Dechct.
Dechct = β1S
m
hct + κc +Xhct + εhct (8)
Dechct = β1S
dif
hct + κc +Xhct + εhct (9)
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 7, and suggest that there is generally a positive
correlation between maternal education and the mother’s reported decision-making power. We
can also conduct a more indirect test, not reported, in which we evaluate whether total household
expenditure in certain categories (children’s education, and children’s healthcare) is correlated with
25Again, this result is identical if the larger sample of households with two children observed is employed.
26These include decisions about children’s schooling, purchase of durable goods, choice of crops, purchase of live-
stock, managing family finances, parenting methods, and household management.
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the mother’s education, conditional on household characteristics including household income. We
find that total educational expenditure is higher in households with more educated mothers, and
there is weak evidence of more expenditure on children’s healthcare.27 (Interestingly, there is no
evidence of greater decision-making power for mothers of sons.)
The observed patterns of decision-making and expenditure seem to suggest that maternal educa-
tion is in fact a plausible proxy for the mother’s bargaining power within the household.28 However,
this evidence of greater bargaining power for more educated mothers is only useful in interpreting
the primary results if mothers in fact do have a relatively greater preference for intrahousehold
compensation vis-a-vis fathers. We do not have any direct evidence about the differences in prefer-
ences across parents, but we can test whether greater bargaining power is correlated with greater
compensation by re-estimating the primary specification, adding an interaction term between the
non-cognitive index and a dummy variable capturing the mother’s reported decision-making power
around parenting decisions; the dummy variable is defined equal to one if she reports any decision-
making power around parenting decisions, and zero otherwise. The specification of interest can
thus be written as follows, where DecDhct denotes the decision-making dummy.
Yihct = β1Noncogihct + β2Noncogihct × Shct + β3Noncogihct ×DecDhct + β4Xihct (10)
+ νt + ηh + εihct
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 7, and the estimated coefficient β3 is significant
and negative, consistent with households in which mothers have more decision-making power com-
pensating children with worse non-cognitive skills more.29 Again, mothers who are more educated
and/or who have more bargaining power—characteristics that are closely correlated— appear to
be able to exercise a preference for greater within-household compensation.
However, it is also important to note that the coefficients β2 on maternal schooling also remain
significant and large in magnitude. This may suggest that bargaining power is not the only channel
through which maternal education affects compensatory behavior. More educated women may also
have different preferences, opting for more compensatory investment. Though the evidence suggests
greater bargaining power is important, we cannot rule out that more educated mothers also have
different preferences compared to less educated mothers.
These results also raise the question of whether it is solely the level of maternal education that
affects observed decisions about child investment, or the difference between maternal and paternal
education. If we re-estimate the primary results restricting the sample to households where parents
27Tabulations are not reported for concision, but are available upon request.
28These results are similar, though less precise, if estimated for the larger sample of households with two children
observed.
29These results are not significant when the continuous measure of decision-making power is employed, suggesting
that there is some non-linearity in the relationship between maternal bargaining power and parental compensation.
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are relatively close in education (i.e., excluding households falling in the top and bottom 25% of
the distribution of the within-household educational gap), we observe that more educated women
still report greater decision-making power, and households with more educated women still show
evidence of greater compensation. In other words, high-education women married to high-education
men exhibit more compensatory behavior than low-education women married to low-education men.
This suggests that the level of education is important.
However, we can also re-estimate our primary specification by replacing the interaction of
maternal education and non-cognitive skills with the interaction of the difference in education
(maternal minus paternal) and non-cognitive skills, and we also observe greater compensation
in households where the difference in education is more positive. In other words, low-education
women married to low-education men show more compensatory behavior than low-education women
married to high-education men. This evidence, in conjunction with the results presented in Panel
A of Table 7, suggests that the difference in education is also relevant.30
Both the difference in education and the level of education seem important in determining
parents’ joint decision. This is consistent with higher education for mothers leading to both more
bargaining power for women within the household and a greater preference for compensation.
5 Catch-up in non-cognitive skills over time
Given the evidence about compensatory investment in households with educated mothers, it is
plausible to hypothesize that over time, children of educated mothers with worse non-cognitive
skills should begin to catch up relative to their siblings (assuming, of course, that there are in
fact positive returns to educational expenditure in that increased expenditure leads to enhanced
non-cognitive skills). In other words, the persistence over time of non-cognitive challenges should
be weaker for children of highly educated mothers.
In this data, the younger sibling is only observed once (in the second wave of the survey employed
here), while the older sibling is observed in all three survey waves. Accordingly, to test whether
catch-up in non-cognitive skills is more evident in more educated households, we examine whether
the longitudinal correlation in child characteristics for the older child is weaker in households with
a more educated mother.31 More specifically, we regress various measures of non-cognitive skills
30The fact that the difference in education is also correlated with greater compensation also suggests that it is
unlikely that greater compensation in higher maternal-education households reflects a pattern of assortative mating
in which high-education women choose spouses whose preferences match their own. Even comparing across households
where the woman is relatively uneducated, and thus presumably commands less power in the marriage market, we
observe that a woman who is relatively more educated within her household is able to exert a preference for greater
compensation.
31Another test that could be implemented is to examine whether the absolute difference in human capital charac-
teristics between the first-born and second-born children is narrower in wave two in households with more educated
mothers. This would be consistent with compensatory investment already successfully leading to “catch-up” by the
weaker sibling. This test shows no significant differences in the absolute difference comparing across households with
more or less educated mothers. Tabulations are not reported for concision, but are available upon request.
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observed in 2009 and 2004 on earlier measures of non-cognitive skills for the same child. In 2009, the
psychometric measures include a Rosenberg index of self-esteem, and an index of depression.32 In
2004, internalizing and externalizing indices are reported as already noted; in 2000, the internalizing
and externalizing indices are reported, as well as a self-esteem measure.
In the psychology literature, it is also common to use rank-order measures for personality
traits (Shiner and Caspi, 2003; Roberts and DelVecchio, 2000). This is particularly relevant when
employing longitudinal data in which subjects are observed at very different ages. Accordingly, for
this analysis we convert all the non-cognitive measures into percentile measures ranking the child
with respect to children of the same gender and the same age group; the child with the strongest
non-cognitive skills is assigned the highest percentile.33
These measures of non-cognitive skills will be denoted Psychihct for child i in household h in
county c born in year t, and the superscript will indicate the year in which the data was observed.
Thus the primary equations of interest can be written as follows, regressing non-cognitive outcomes
on outcomes from the previous wave and the interaction of the previous outcome with a household-
level input that can lead to catch up in non-cognitive skills, Ihct. Ihct can be a dummy variable for
the mother or father having a high level of education (above the median), or reported discretionary
educational expenditure on the child of interest in the previous wave. We also include an interaction
term with household net income as measured in 2004. The specifications of interest are written as
follows.
Ncog2009ihct = β1Ncog
2004
ihct + β2Ncog
2004
ihct × Ihct + β3Ncog2004ihct × Inchct (11)
+ β4Xhct + νt + κc + εihct
Ncog2004ihct = β1Ncog
2000
ihct + β2Ncog
2000
ihct × Ihct + β3Ncog2004ihct × Inchct (12)
+ β4Xhct + νt + κc + εihct
Xihct denotes a vector of child- and household-level controls, and standard errors are clustered
at the county level. The control variables of interest are drawn from the same set of covariates
employed in the earlier analysis: cognitive test scores as measured in 2000 and 2004, math and
Chinese test scores as measured in 2004, height-for-age as measured in 2004, household net in-
come, fixed capital and assets as measured in 2004, paternal and maternal education dummies, the
number of siblings in the family, gender, gender of the younger sibling, sibling gender interacted
with the number of siblings, and county and year-of-birth fixed effects. In the specifications in-
cluding an interaction effect with expenditure, we also include linear and quadratic terms for total
and discretionary educational expenditure, and a dummy for discretionary expenditure above the
32We invert the depression index, such that a higher depression index is indicative of subjects’ being less depressed.
33The primary results are similar when estimated employing the original variables, though more noisily estimated.
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median.
The results of estimating equations (11) and (12) for maternal and paternal education dum-
mies and educational expenditure are reported in Table 8. Note a positive coefficient β1 can be
interpreted as evidence of persistence of non-cognitive skills over time, and a negative coefficient
β2 can be interpreted as catch-up in households with higher levels of parental education or more
educational expenditure. The interaction terms with maternal and paternal education are included
in the same specification.
First, it is useful to note that non-cognitive skills at ages 9–12 (as measured in 2000) do not
seem to be particularly strongly correlated with non-cognitive skills at ages 13–16 (as measured in
2004); β1 is positive, but not always statistically significant. There appears to be greater evidence
of persistence between ages 13–16 and young adulthood, or between 2004 and 2009.
Second, and more importantly, there is also evidence of catch-up in non-cognitive skills for
children of more educated mothers (as reported in Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7), and for children who
receive more educational expenditure (as reported in Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8). This is observed
both between 2000 and 2004 and between 2004 and 2009, and is consistent with compensatory
investment by mothers facilitating catch-up by children with weaker non-cognitive skills. It is,
however, important to be cautious in interpreting the evidence of catch-up as evidence of returns
to the specific educational investments observed: more educated mothers may also make additional,
unobserved investments targeting children with weaker non-cognitive skills that leads to catch-up.34
The interaction terms with paternal education, by contrast, are generally positive and insignif-
icant. Given that there was little evidence that more educated fathers compensated children char-
acterized by lower non-cognitive skills with additional investment, this is consistent with our prior
results.
An alternate test that captures the same fundamental empirical pattern examines the cross-
household correlation between non-cognitive skills and a dummy variable for the household being
characterized by high maternal education, conditional on the same set of control variables. This
correlation is increasing in magnitude in each wave: in the first wave, the observed cross-household
correlation between a dummy for a mother of high maternal education and the percentile measures
of non-cognitive skills is essentially zero. In the second wave, the correlation has increased in
magnitude to .028, and by the third wave, .151. The difference between the first- and third-wave
coefficients is statistically significant at the five percent level, respectively. There is no evidence of
a comparable pattern for paternal education.
Given this pattern, it is also useful to briefly reconsider our primary results of heterogeneous
response to variation in non-cognitive skills with respect to parental education. The longitudinal
34It may also be useful to analyze whether there is any heterogeneity in these patterns with respect to the initial
level of reported non-cognitive skills of the child: i.e., are there greater observed returns to educational investment
for a child who initially reports lower or higher non-cognitive skills? We test whether there is any heterogeneity in
the coefficients estimated in equation (11) with respect to initial non-cognitive measures and find no evidence of such
heterogeneity.
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evidence suggests that in households with more educated mothers, compensatory investments may
already have succeeded in generating some catch-up in non-cognitive skills among first-born children
with weaker non-cognitive skills prior to wave two. However, we have already presented evidence
in section 4.1 (Table A4) that the primary results are robust to employing the initial, wave-one
measure of non-cognitive skills for the older child. In addition, any catch-up prior to wave two would
lead to a narrowing of the gap in non-cognitive skills between children of an educated mother, and
thus lead us to underestimate the compensatory behavior engaged in by these mothers. There is
no obvious source of bias that would lead us to erroneously conclude that educated mothers are
compensating when in fact they are reinforcing.
Considering the long-term effect of the observed patterns, if we again compare a child with a
mother below the median level of education to a child with a mother above the median level of
education for the former child, a one standard deviation decrease in the non-cognitive index in
adolescence leads to a .228 decrease in the Rosenberg index in young adulthood (i.e., the child has
lower self-esteem).35 For the latter child, however, the same decrease in the non-cognitive index in
adolescence does not lead to any statistically significant change in self-esteem in adulthood. If there
are positive returns in the labor market to non-cognitive skills such as self-esteem, this pattern may
have meaningful economic implications.
In addition, these results may raise the question of why parents appear to utilize educational
expenditure as a tool to address deficits in non-cognitive skills as opposed to some other form of
expenditure more explicitly targeted at developing these skills. We should note that we cannot
rule out that parents are simultaneously making other, more targeted investments, in expenditure
or in time, to develop non-cognitive skills, and that the observed pattern represents primarily
returns to these unobserved investments. As previously highlighted, educational expenditure is the
only type of child-specific investment reported in this survey other than medical care. However,
given that these are relatively resource-constrained households, forms of expenditure that might
be considered appropriate for developing non-cognitive skills in a developing country context (e.g.,
therapeutic interventions, additional attention from teachers, or intense supervision by parents)
may be unavailable. In fact, both parents report spending only around four hours total per week
with their children playing, talking, or assisting with homework, and this includes time spent with
both children.
If we examine the evidence about categories of expenditure that respond to non-cognitive skills,
referring back to Table 3, we observe the largest effects for food at school, transportation to school,
and tutoring. Tutoring, presumably including one-on-one attention, may be a viable strategy to
enhance non-cognitive skills. Expenditure on food at school and transportation to school may
correspond to a decision to allow the child to spend more time at school or attend a school that is
farther away from home, enhancing exposure to peers and teachers and potentially enhancing non-
35We assume the father is also above the median level of education, and thus the relevant coefficient is the sum of
.110 and .118 as reported in Column (5) of Table 8.
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cognitive skills. Needless to say, we also cannot rule out that these investments lead to simultaneous
enhanced development of cognitive skills.
6 Conclusion
The decisions parents make about how to allocate educational investments among children have
major implications for policies targeting human capital accumulation. As greater emphasis is placed
on the development of non-cognitive skills as well as cognitive skills as a strategy for increasing
long-term welfare, it is even more important to understand how parents may respond to observed
differences in non-cognitive skills, and whether they seek to address any detectable deficits.
The evidence in this paper suggests that in a rural developing country context, households
with more educated mothers may engage in more compensatory behavior, targeting expenditure to
children with weak non-cognitive skills, when compared to households with less educated mothers.
Over time, this leads to greater persistence in non-cognitive challenges in households with less
educated mothers, while children in households with more educated mothers show evidence of catch-
up. While the observed pattern would be consistent with many channels and we must be cautious in
interpreting our findings, the evidence presented here suggests that both greater bargaining power
for more educated mothers and a differential preference for compensation among more educated
mothers are relevant.
Given that Gansu is one of the poorest regions of China—our sample is characterized by per
capita income of only around $200—our results suggest that compensatory behavior by parents
can be found even in resource-constrained settings. This pattern also may have implications for
interventions targeted to strengthen non-cognitive skills. If more educated mothers respond to such
interventions by redirecting expenditure away from the child whose skills have been strengthened,
this may be a mechanism that decreases the long-term benefits for the targeted child. There may,
however, be positive spillovers for other siblings.
It is important to note that our sample is relatively small and drawn from only one province
in China, and we cannot conclude that the observed phenomenon is a general one. However, our
results suggest that the question of whether differential household responses to child variation in
non-cognitive skills widen cross-household inequality in human capital over time may merit further
analysis.
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7 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Data structure
Figure 2: Parental education
(a) Maternal education (b) Paternal education
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Figure 3: Intra-household differences in non-cognitive skills and expenditure, by Mother’s Education
(a) Non-cognitive skills (b) Expenditure
For each level of mother’s education in years, the bottom bar corresponds to the minimum value of
between-sibling absolute differences in non-cognitive skills (Figure 3a) or between-sibling absolute
differences in normalized educational expenditure residuals (Figure 3b), while the top bar corresponds to
the maximum value. The rectangle corresponds to the interquartile range, with the median value
represented by the bold line bisecting the rectangle. Normalized expenditure residuals are calculated by
regressing expenditure on child characteristics (gender, birth parity, cognitive skills, and height-for-age),
generating the residuals and standardizing them to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Demographic data Panel B: Educational expenditure per child
Sample Subsample p-value Mean Std. Dev. Max.
Net income 6848.56 6728.28 .863 Total 361.52 343.1 2900
Income per capita 1717.76 1631.04 .581 Discretionary 149.03 215.65 1660
Mother education 4.31 4.35 .805 Tuition 212.49 185.47 2000
Father education 7.12 7.16 .837 Supplies 47.07 43.55 300
Mother age 39.19 36.97 .000 Transportation 19.67 50.99 500
Father age 42.57 38.89 .072 Food 59.12 139.08 1200
Index child age 15.09 14.96 .013 Tutoring 9.66 21.42 110
Internalizing index -.01 .01 .634 Other fees 13.50 36.41 360
Externalizing index .03 -.01 .280
Achievement index 0 .06 .183
Obs. 1918 388
Notes: The sample encompasses the full sample of households that report income data; this is 1914 out of the full
sample of 2000 households in the survey. The subsample is households with two-children families in which both
children report data on non-cognitive skills as well as height-for-age. There are 388 households in the subsample of
interest, and 776 children. Income is reported in yuan; educational expenditure is reported in yuan per semester.
Internalizing, externalizing and achievement indices have been standardized to have means equal to zero and
standard deviations equal to one. A higher internalizing or externalizing index is indicative of higher non-cognitive
skills. Column (3) reports the p-value for a test of equality of means across the sample and subsample.
25
T
ab
le
2:
N
on
-c
og
n
it
iv
e
sk
il
ls
an
d
ch
il
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
In
te
rn
a
l
E
x
te
rn
a
l
In
te
rn
a
l
E
x
te
rn
a
l
In
te
rn
a
l
E
x
te
rn
a
l
In
te
rn
a
l
E
x
te
rn
a
l
In
te
rn
a
l
E
x
te
rn
a
l
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
P
a
n
e
l
A
:
C
h
il
d
ch
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s
S
ib
li
n
g
p
a
ri
ty
.0
0
3
-.
1
1
8
∗∗
.1
4
3
.1
3
1
(.
0
5
8
)
(.
0
5
9
)
(.
1
4
0
)
(.
1
1
9
)
A
g
e
.0
0
8
.0
3
9
∗∗
.0
0
7
-.
0
7
6
∗
(.
0
1
7
)
(.
0
1
8
)
(.
0
5
1
)
(.
0
4
4
)
F
em
a
le
-.
0
0
6
.3
1
5
∗∗
∗
-.
0
0
7
.2
8
9
∗∗
∗
(.
0
7
7
)
(.
0
8
3
)
(.
0
8
0
)
(.
0
7
4
)
G
ra
d
e
le
v
el
.0
1
5
.0
6
8
∗∗
∗
.0
4
6
.1
5
9
∗∗
∗
(.
0
1
9
)
(.
0
2
0
)
(.
0
4
5
)
(.
0
5
4
)
O
b
s.
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
P
a
n
e
l
B
:
C
o
g
n
it
iv
e
sk
il
ls
a
n
d
h
e
a
lt
h
H
ei
g
h
t-
fo
r-
a
g
e
.0
1
9
.0
5
2
.0
2
5
.0
5
6
(.
0
3
5
)
(.
0
4
6
)
(.
0
3
3
)
(.
0
4
5
)
M
a
th
sc
o
re
-.
0
0
0
7
.0
0
2
-.
0
0
0
5
-.
0
0
0
9
(.
0
0
3
)
(.
0
0
5
)
(.
0
0
5
)
(.
0
0
5
)
C
h
in
es
e
sc
o
re
.0
0
0
9
.0
0
5
.0
0
4
.0
0
7
(.
0
0
5
)
(.
0
0
5
)
(.
0
0
7
)
(.
0
0
7
)
A
ch
ie
v
em
en
t
sc
o
re
-.
0
0
6
∗∗
-.
0
0
5
-.
0
0
6
∗∗
-.
0
0
5
∗
(.
0
0
3
)
(.
0
0
3
)
(.
0
0
3
)
(.
0
0
3
)
O
b
s.
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
7
7
6
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
th
e
in
te
rn
a
li
zi
n
g
a
n
d
ex
te
rn
a
li
zi
n
g
in
d
ic
es
.
A
h
ig
h
er
in
te
rn
a
li
zi
n
g
o
r
ex
te
rn
a
li
zi
n
g
in
d
ex
is
in
d
ic
a
ti
v
e
o
f
h
ig
h
er
n
o
n
-c
o
g
n
it
iv
e
sk
il
ls
.
T
h
e
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
sp
ec
ifi
ed
ch
il
d
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
c,
a
ll
m
ea
su
re
d
in
th
e
se
co
n
d
w
av
e;
a
ll
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
a
n
d
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
co
u
n
ty
le
v
el
.
A
st
er
is
k
s
in
d
ic
a
te
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
0
,
5
a
n
d
1
p
er
ce
n
t
le
v
el
s.
26
Table 3: Parental allocations and non-cognitive skills
Total Discretionary Tuition Supplies Transportation Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Internalizing index
Index -4.390 -7.892 3.501 .806 -.291 -9.552 -.902 2.047
(11.481) (8.480) (4.119) (1.641) (1.197) (6.059) (.758) (1.503)
Obs. 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
Panel B: Externalizing index
Index 4.533 -.370 4.903 2.592∗ .668 -4.770 -.166 1.306
(12.870) (8.001) (6.212) (1.419) (1.387) (5.670) (.726) (1.016)
Obs. 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
Mean (dep. var.) 276.748 104.052 172.696 38.164 12.011 37.679 6.218 9.98
St. dev. (dep. var.) 286.515 174.218 161.381 38.785 40.065 109.107 17.357 28.532
Notes: The dependent variables are educational expenditure per semester per child in the specified category; total
expenditure is the sum of all categories, and discretionary expenditure is the sum of all categories excluding tuition.
The independent variable is the specified index of internalizing or externalizing behavior. A higher internalizing or
externalizing index is indicative of higher non-cognitive skills. All specifications include controls for sibling parity,
gender, sibling gender, height-for-age and cognitive skills measured contemporaneously with non-cognitive skills,
year-of-birth and household fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the county level. Asterisks indicate
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Table 4: Heterogeneous effects with respect to parental education
Total Discretionary Tuition Supplies Transportation Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Internalizing index and maternal education
Index 37.205∗∗ 24.203∗ 13.002∗ 1.483 5.042∗ 11.819 1.253 4.607∗∗
(16.841) (13.755) (6.998) (1.472) (2.624) (10.744) (.792) (2.329)
Index x mother educ. -9.902∗∗ -7.640∗∗ -2.262 -.161 -1.270∗∗ -5.087∗∗ -.513∗∗ -.609
(4.163) (3.533) (1.631) (.420) (.569) (2.523) (.235) (.451)
Obs. 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
Panel B: Internalizing index and paternal education
Index -4.099 -12.127 8.028 -2.470 5.641 -7.935 -2.217 -5.146∗∗
(24.006) (18.434) (8.936) (1.679) (3.459) (14.997) (1.589) (2.286)
Index x father educ. -.237 .529 -.767 .470∗ -.832∗ -.245 .162 .975∗∗
(2.612) (1.789) (1.452) (.254) (.425) (1.463) (.148) (.445)
Test βm2 = β
f
2 .042
∗∗ .019∗∗ .439 .200 .392 .061∗ .031∗∗ .017∗∗
Obs. 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766
Panel C: Externalizing index and maternal education
Index 41.322∗∗∗ 23.811∗∗ 17.511∗∗ .702 5.817∗∗ 14.085∗ 1.421∗∗ 1.786
(13.093) (10.156) (7.321) (1.175) (2.453) (7.310) (.716) (1.527)
Index x mother educ. -9.859∗∗ -6.481∗ -3.379 .507 -1.380∗∗ -5.053∗∗ -.425 -.129
(4.805) (3.389) (2.597) (.496) (.636) (2.261) (.295) (.352)
Obs. 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
Panel D: Externalizing index and paternal education
Index -22.736 -23.141 .406 -1.428 1.188 -19.168 -1.521 -2.211
(31.726) (18.981) (17.179) (2.378) (3.198) (15.260) (1.454) (2.066)
Index x father educ. 3.785 3.087 .698 .550∗ -.084 1.957 .173 .492
(3.276) (1.972) (1.891) (.307) (.402) (1.553) (.146) (.364)
Test βm2 = β
f
2 .037
∗∗ .023∗∗ .309 .932 .066∗ .026∗∗ .088∗ .314
Obs. 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766
Mean (dep. var.) 276.748 104.052 172.696 38.164 12.011 37.679 6.218 9.98
St. dev. (dep. var.) 286.515 174.218 161.381 38.785 40.065 109.107 17.357 28.532
Notes: The dependent variables are educational expenditure per semester per child in the specified category; total
expenditure is the sum of all categories, and discretionary expenditure is the sum of all categories excluding tuition.
The independent variable is the specified index of internalizing or externalizing behavior, as well as the index
interacted with the specified measure of parental education in years. A higher internalizing or externalizing index is
indicative of higher non-cognitive skills. Time invested by the mother (father) is re-scaled to have the same mean as
education of the mother (father). All specifications include controls for sibling parity, gender, sibling gender,
height-for-age and cognitive skills measured contemporaneously with non-cognitive skills, year-of-birth and
household fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the county level. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent levels.
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Table 5: Non-cognitive skills and parental learning
Total Discretionary Tuition Supplies Transp. Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Non-cognitive index and maternal time investment
Index 64.611∗∗∗ 41.790∗∗∗ 22.821∗∗∗ 3.332∗∗ 6.898∗∗∗ 23.685∗∗ 2.613∗ 5.262∗∗
(17.031) (13.562) (8.696) (1.607) (2.619) (10.398) (1.349) (2.674)
Index x mother educ. -12.136∗∗ -8.708∗∗ -3.429 .227 -1.669∗∗ -6.262∗∗ -.579∗ -.424
(4.998) (4.081) (2.137) (.532) (.667) (2.843) (.301) (.455)
Index x time -3.613 -2.718 -.895 -.476 -.016 -1.683 -.214 -.328∗
(3.185) (2.612) (.919) (.323) (.284) (2.254) (.173) (.187)
Obs. 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
Panel B: Non-cognitive index and paternal time investment
Index -22.058 -24.642 2.584 -1.484 2.593 -20.127 -2.550 -3.074∗
(35.023) (23.014) (16.578) (3.306) (2.862) (18.908) (2.082) (1.692)
Index x father educ. 2.065 2.108 -.044 .590∗ -.552 .987 .203 .880∗∗
(3.077) (1.777) (1.866) (.313) (.386) (1.521) (.171) (.424)
Index x time .745 .444 .301 -.085 .179 .472 .033 -.154
(1.149) (.643) (.612) (.255) (.140) (.424) (.082) (.115)
Obs. 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766
Mean (dep. var.) 276.748 104.052 172.696 38.164 12.011 37.679 6.218 9.98
St. dev. (dep. var.) 286.515 174.218 161.381 38.785 40.065 109.107 17.357 28.532
Notes: The dependent variables in Panels A and B are educational expenditure per semester per child in the
specified category; total expenditure is the sum of all categories, and discretionary expenditure is the sum of all
categories excluding tuition. The independent variables are the specified index of internalizing or externalizing
behavior, the index interacted with the specified measure of parental education in years, and the index interacted
with the amount of time the parent reports spending with children playing, talking or assisting with homework in a
typical week. A higher internalizing or externalizing index is indicative of higher non-cognitive skills. All
specifications include controls for sibling parity, gender, sibling gender, height-for-age and cognitive skills measured
contemporaneously with non-cognitive skills, year-of-birth and household fixed effects, and standard errors clustered
at the county level. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the county. Asterisks indicate significance at the
10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous effects with respect to maternal education and income
Total Discretionary Tuition Supplies Transportation Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Index 49.585∗∗∗ 31.957∗∗ 17.628∗∗ 1.460 7.045∗∗ 17.358∗ 1.956∗∗ 4.139∗
(16.426) (13.209) (7.642) (1.290) (2.992) (10.136) (.811) (2.229)
Index x mother educ. -12.456∗∗ -8.359∗∗ -4.097∗ .228 -1.585∗∗∗ -6.142∗∗ -.504 -.356
(5.102) (4.078) (2.329) (.569) (.609) (2.885) (.316) (.482)
Index x income -.079 -.875 .796 -.070 -.120 -.409 -.135 -.141
(1.047) (.745) (.534) (.111) (.149) (.488) (.093) (.106)
Obs. 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
Mean (dep. var.) 276.748 104.052 172.696 38.164 12.011 37.679 6.218 9.98
St. dev. (dep. var.) 286.515 174.218 161.381 38.785 40.065 109.107 17.357 28.532
Notes: The dependent variables are educational expenditure per semester per child in the specified category; total
expenditure is the sum of all categories, and discretionary expenditure is the sum of all categories excluding tuition.
The independent variable is the specified index of internalizing or externalizing behavior, the index interacted with
the specified measure of parental education in years, and the index interacted with household net income. A higher
internalizing or externalizing index is indicative of higher non-cognitive skills. Net income is re-scaled to have the
same mean as maternal education. All specifications include controls for sibling parity, gender, sibling gender,
height-for-age and cognitive skills, year-of-birth and household fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the
county level. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Table 7: Maternal education and bargaining power
Panel A: Reported household decision-making by mother
All decisions Parenting decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dif educ. .036∗ .004
(.019) (.006)
Mother educ. .051∗∗ .017∗∗
(.025) (.008)
Mean 2.952 2.952 .857 .857
Obs. 383 388 383 388
Panel B: Non-cognitive index and maternal decision-making
Index 83.329∗∗ 65.016∗∗∗ 18.313 1.520 15.704∗∗ 39.566∗∗ 6.022∗∗∗ 2.203
(32.658) (22.531) (17.700) (3.505) (6.584) (16.354) (1.948) (2.331)
Index x mother educ. -12.341∗∗ -8.816∗∗ -3.526∗ .178 -1.626∗∗ -6.321∗∗ -.580∗ -.467
(5.022) (4.076) (2.091) (.530) (.657) (2.821) (.313) (.482)
Index x decision-making -38.079 -38.922∗∗ .844 -.209 -9.974 -25.786∗ -4.843∗∗∗ 1.890
(29.077) (17.601) (16.857) (3.544) (6.219) (13.167) (1.774) (2.241)
Obs. 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
Mean (dep. var.) 276.748 104.052 172.696 38.164 12.011 37.679 6.218 9.98
St. dev. (dep. var.) 286.515 174.218 161.381 38.785 40.065 109.107 17.357 28.532
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A, Columns (1) and (2) is an index indicating the numbers of decisions a
mother makes, as reported by the mother (ranges from 0 to 7); the dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is an
index indicating the number of parenting-related decisions a mother makes, as reported by the mother (ranges from
0 to2). The independent variables in Panel A are the difference between maternal education and paternal education
in years or maternal education in years, as specified, and controls included are household net income, per-capita
income, maternal and paternal age, and county fixed effects. In Panel B, the dependent variables are educational
expenditure as defined in Table 3, and the independent variables are the non-cognitive index, the index interacted
with a dummy variable equal to one if the mother reports any decision-making power around parenting, and the
index interacted with maternal education. A higher internalizing or externalizing index is indicative of higher
non-cognitive skills. Specifications in Panel B include controls for sibling parity, gender, sibling gender,
height-for-age and cognitive skills, year-of-birth and household fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the
county level. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Table 8: Persistence of non-cognitive skills in percentile and parental education
Internal 2004 External 2004 Rosenberg 2009 Depression 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Psychometric index 2000 .001 .067 -.005 .046
(.093) (.078) (.059) (.054)
Mother educ. 2000 int. -.143∗∗ -.083
(.059) (.070)
Father educ. 2000 int. .159 .127
(.121) (.106)
Exp. 2000 int. -.002∗∗∗ -.0009∗∗
(.0005) (.0004)
Psychometric index 2004 .110 .093 .131∗∗ .164∗∗∗
(.096) (.070) (.063) (.048)
Mother educ. 2004 int. -.181∗ -.004
(.107) (.099)
Father educ. 2004 int. .118 -.025
(.116) (.106)
Exp. 2004 int. -.00002 -.0004∗∗
(.0003) (.0002)
Obs. 550 550 550 550 408 408 410 410
Notes: The dependent variables are the specified measure of non-cognitive skills from waves two and three,
calculated in percentile terms. A higher index in internalizing or externalizing behavior is indicative of higher
non-cognitive skills. A higher percentile in the Rosenberg index is associated with higher self-esteem. The
depression index is inverted, and thus a higher percentile in the depression index is indicative of a lower level of
depression. The independent variables include the psychometric index, the mean of internalizing and externalizing
indices from waves one and two, calculated in percentile terms. The psychometric index is also interacted with
dummy variables for the mother’s (father’s) education being above the median, and discretionary educational
expenditure. All specifications include controls for cognitive skills measured in waves one and two, grades in math
and Chinese, height-for-age, the parental education dummy variables, net income, assets, and fixed capital in the
household, the number of siblings, sibling gender, and sibling gender interacted with the number of siblings, and
county and year-of-birth fixed effects; the specifications including an interaction effect with expenditure also include
linear and quadratic terms for total and discretionary educational expenditure, and a dummy for discretionary
expenditure above the median. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the county. Asterisks indicate
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Appendix
Table A1: Within-household and cross-household variation
Internal External Height-for-age Achievement score Grades
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Fixed effects Household Year Household Year Household Year Household Year Household Year
Obs. 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
R-squared .586 .021 .592 .016 .638 .053 .539 .054 .64 .034
Notes: Each column reports the R-squared for the regression of the specified child characteristic on the specified set
of fixed effects.
Table A2: Parental allocations and non-cognitive skills: Households with two or more children
Total Discretionary Tuition Supplies Transportation Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Index 29.733∗∗ 18.451∗ 11.282∗∗ .786 4.462∗ 9.526 1.042 2.635∗∗
(12.185) (9.588) (5.406) (.965) (2.334) (7.144) (.965) (1.119)
Index x mother educ. -8.238∗∗ -5.680∗∗ -2.558 .269 -.864 -3.756∗ -.999 -.330
(3.554) (2.896) (1.576) (.335) (.540) (1.973) (.668) (.275)
Obs. 1132 1132 1132 1132 1132 1132 1132 1132
Mean (dep. var.) 261.867 94.244 167.622 36.22 10.658 31.111 7.025 9.23
St. dev. (dep. var.) 273.416 168.236 148.407 37.226 37.467 102.985 33.987 30.367
Notes: The dependent variables are educational expenditure per semester per child in the specified category; total
expenditure is the sum of all categories, and discretionary expenditure is the sum of all categories excluding tuition.
The independent variable is a mean index of non-cognitive skills and the interaction of this index with maternal
education. A higher internalizing or externalizing index is indicative of higher non-cognitive skills. All specifications
include controls for sibling parity, gender, sibling gender, height-for-age and cognitive skills, year-of-birth and
household fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the county level. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10, 5
and 1 percent levels.
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Table A3: Heterogeneous effects with respect to maternal favorite
Total Discretionary Tuition Supplies Transportation Food Tutoring Other
Index 50.014∗∗∗ 30.990∗∗ 19.024∗∗ 1.462 6.861∗∗ 16.978 1.791∗∗ 3.897∗
(16.241) (13.449) (7.840) (1.269) (2.891) (10.437) (.864) (2.221)
Index x mother educ. -12.671∗∗ -9.154∗∗ -3.517∗ .139 -1.679∗∗ -6.530∗∗ -.619∗ -.465
(5.034) (4.124) (2.117) (.507) (.654) (2.872) (.318) (.478)
Favorite -24.561 -20.333 -4.228 -8.111 -.534 -8.259 .707 -4.136∗
(32.892) (25.428) (13.583) (7.634) (4.785) (18.374) (2.519) (2.431)
Favorite x mother educ. 8.817 8.500 .317 2.386 .366 4.422 .572 .754
(9.016) (6.463) (3.523) (2.025) (1.225) (4.520) (.499) (.534)
Obs. 776 776 776 776 776 776 776 776
Mean (dep. var.) 276.748 104.052 172.696 38.164 12.011 37.679 6.218 9.98
St. dev. (dep. var.) 286.515 174.218 161.381 38.785 40.065 109.107 17.357 28.532
Notes: The dependent variable is educational expenditure in the specified category, and the independent variables
are the non-cognitive index and a dummy for the child being reported as the maternal favorite, and both variables
interacted with maternal education. A higher internalizing or externalizing index is indicative of higher
non-cognitive skills. All specifications include controls for sibling parity, gender, sibling gender, height-for-age and
cognitive skills measured contemporaneously with non-cognitive skills, year-of-birth and household fixed effects, and
standard errors clustered at the county level. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the county.
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Table A4: Heterogeneous effects: non-cognitive skills at primary school age
Total Discretionary Tuition Supplies Transp. and food Tutoring Other fees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Maternal education and non-cognitive index
Index 10.211∗ 7.510∗ 2.701 1.626 2.700∗ .285 -.174
(6.130) (4.533) (3.351) (2.106) (1.459) (.352) (1.595)
Index x mother educ. -3.214∗∗ -2.464∗∗ -.750 -.862∗ -1.130∗ -.087 .007
(1.545) (1.108) (.859) (.458) (.608) (.085) (.470)
Obs. 766 766 766 766 766 766 766
Panel B: Paternal education and non-cognitive index
Index -11.089 5.524 -16.613 .944 -1.778 -.656∗ 4.419∗∗
(14.872) (6.657) (11.945) (2.231) (1.802) (.386) (2.144)
Index x father educ. 1.023 -1.201∗ 2.224 -.402 -.052 .077 -.647∗∗
(2.044) (.640) (1.738) (.291) (.256) (.057) (.292)
Obs. 756 756 756 756 756 756 756
Mean (dep. var.) 159.95 49.19 110.76 25.06 5.42 1.52 9.75
St. dev. (dep. var.) 133.65 78.21 89.91 24.35 32.7 7.9 25.11
Notes: The dependent variables are educational expenditure per semester per child in the specified category at
primary school age (as observed in wave one for the first-born child and in wave two for the second-born child); total
expenditure is the sum of all categories, and discretionary expenditure is the sum of all categories excluding tuition.
The independent variable is a non-cognitive index as measured at primary school age, as well as the index interacted
with the specified measure of parental education. A higher internalizing or externalizing index is indicative of higher
non-cognitive skills. All specifications include controls for sibling parity, gender, sibling gender, height-for-age and
cognitive skills measured contemporaneously with non-cognitive skills, age and household fixed effects, and standard
errors clustered at the county level. Asterisks indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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Table A5: Alternate measures of non-cognitive skills: teacher reports
Total Discretionary Tuition Supplies Transportation Food Tutoring Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Teacher index 30.546 26.496∗ 4.050 7.098 3.872 12.838 .441 2.247
(27.486) (15.541) (15.045) (4.485) (5.291) (8.329) (2.177) (1.943)
Index x mother educ. -16.312∗∗∗ -14.123∗∗∗ -2.190 -1.705∗∗ -2.783∗∗ -9.074∗∗∗ -.368 -.193
(6.082) (4.401) (2.839) (.712) (1.208) (2.725) (.611) (.326)
Obs. 774 774 774 774 774 774 774 774
Mean (dep. var.) 276.748 104.052 172.696 38.164 12.011 37.679 6.218 9.98
St. dev. (dep. var.) 286.515 174.218 161.381 38.785 40.065 109.107 17.357 28.532
Notes: The dependent variables are educational expenditure per semester per child in the specified category; total
expenditure is the sum of all categories, and discretionary expenditure is the sum of all categories excluding tuition.
The independent variables are a dummy variable equal to one if an index of non-cognitive skills based on teacher
reports of the child’s behavior is above the mean, and the interaction of this dummy variable with maternal
education. All specifications include controls for sibling parity, gender, sibling gender, height-for-age and cognitive
skills, year-of-birth and household fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the county level. Asterisks indicate
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
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